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CHOOSING JUSTICES: A POLITICAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS AND THE WAGES
OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

John

C.

Yoo*

IN DEFENSE O F A POLITICAL COURT. By Terri Jennings Peretti.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999. Pp. ix, 371. $27.50
PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION
OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES. By David Alistair Yalof. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. 1999. Pp. x, 296. $27.50

William H. Rehnquist is not going to be Chief Justice forever much to the chagrin of Republicans, no doubt. In the last century,
Supreme Court Justices have retired, on average, at the age of
seventy-one after approximately fourteen years on the bench.1 By the
end of the term of the President we elect this November, Chief Justice
Rehnquist will have served on the Supreme Court for thirty-two years
and reached the age of eighty. The law of averages suggests that Chief
Justice Rehnquist is likely to retire in the next presidential term.
In addition to replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist, the next Presi
dent may also enjoy the opportunity to select at least two other Jus
tices. Justice John Paul Stevens, the next most senior member of the
Court, will turn eighty-four by the end of the next presidential term
and will have served on the Court for thirty years. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the third most senior member of the Court, will have
turned seventy-four and have served for twenty-three years.
This Review is not intended to be a morbid exercise in the actuar
ial sciences. Rather, these numbers serve only to suggest that after six
years in mothballs, the Supreme Court appointments process will be
returning to active duty in relatively short order. This event will not
be universally welcomed because many believe that the confirmation
process has become too political or has failed to live up to the original

* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall).
B.A. 1989, Harvard; J.D. 1992, Yale. - Ed. I thank Jesse Choper, Paul Mishkin, and Robert
Post for their comments. Jason Beutler provided excellent research assistance.

1. The median age at retirement has been 70 after 15 years of service. These calcula
tions are based on statistics found in HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND
SENATORS:
A HISTORY OF TIIE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM
WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 379-81 (1999).
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constitutional design.2 The relatively uncontroversial appointments of
Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg notwithstand
ing, the political struggles over the nominations of Justice Clarence
Thomas and Judge Robert H. Bork, and of Justice Rehnquist to be
Chief Justice, suggest that future nominations will be contentious. If,
as Professor Robert Nagel has observed, judicial power has expanded
such that "in one direction or another, the Court will be a pervasive
influence on a wide range of issues that can only in a partial and pe
ripheral way be considered legal rather than political,"3 it is only inevi
table that players in the political process will seek to advance their
preferences via Supreme Court nominations. Political attention in the
next few years may even be greater than usual because the next Presi
dent's appointments may well determine the Court's direction on
high-profile issues, such as federalism, race, religion, and criminal pro
cedure, that have been decided only by five-to-four votes.
Given the importance of the issues that nominees will decide if ap
pointed, and the recent history of political struggles over the proper
standards to apply to confirmations, it would seem to be the job of the
legal academy to dispense useful advice that might lead to a more sta
ble, non-controversial process. Academics, however, not only have
provided little guidance for improving the Supreme Court appoint
ments process, but often have taken an active role in these political
battles. Further, scholars seem just as divided over what approach to
take - whether Presidents and Senators should appoint nominees
who are merely professionally qualified, or whether they should
choose only those who agree with their political or j urisprudential
preferences - as are the politicians.4 It seems fair to say that finding a
satisfactory answer to the "confirmation mess," as Professor Stephen
Carter has aptly described it, has frustrated our best constitutional
thinkers.5

2 See, e.g., Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101
(1988).

HARV.

L. REV. 1185, 1185

3. Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 860 (1990).
4. One can see this gap in the many articles and symposia that have appeared about the
judicial appointments process since the struggle over the nominations of Judge Robert Bork
and Justice Clarence Thomas. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988); Bruce Fein, Commentary, A Circumscribed Senate Confir
mation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672 (1989); John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate,
the Constitution and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein,

71 TEXAS L. REV. 633 (1993); Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Poli
tics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE LJ. 1491 (1992); Symposium, Confir
mation Controversy: The Selection of a Supreme Court Justice, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 832
(1990); Symposium, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The
Import ofthe Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1992); Collo
quium, The Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEG.
COMMENTARY 1 (1991).
5. See Carter, supra note 2.
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The likelihood that political and scholarly confusion will accom
pany the return of the confirmation process makes the appearance of
two books, Terri Jennings Peretti's In Defense of A Political Court,
and David Alistair Yalof's In Pursuit ofJustices1, particularly welcome
and timely. Both written by political scientists, these works provide
different views of the appointments process from which legal scholars
have much to learn. While much of the legal literature, for example,
has focused on the standards that the Senate ought to apply in con
firming Justices, Yalof instead examines the more decisive process of
presidential selection of Supreme Court nominees. Peretti, whose
work aims at a wider-ranging discussion of the purposes of judicial re
view and the roots of the Court's legitimacy, approaches the question
in a significant, and perhaps novel, manner. Instead of recycling the
same qualifications-versus-politics debate, she first seeks to determine
the proper role of the Supreme Court in the American political sys
tem, and from that inquiry infers the type of Justices that we should
want. All too often, legal scholars debating Supreme Court appoint
ments have ignored the fundamental issue of the Court's role, which
Peretti argues should determine the way we think about choosing Jus
tices.
This review will proceed in three parts. Part I will summarize and
critique Yalof, while Part II will discuss Peretti. Part III will take up
Peretti's challenge by attempting to rethink the appointments process
in light of different theories of judicial review. I will argue that neither
the indeterminacy of constitutional decisionmaking, as Peretti would
have it, nor the expansion of judicial review, as many of our leading
constitutional law professors believe, provides the sole explanation for
the politicization of the confirmation process. Rather, I will argue that
the emergence of judicial claims to supremacy in constitutional inter
pretation has much to do with the growing political attention to the
ideology of Court nominees. In the conclusion, I will offer more prac
tical reform ideas for the appointments process, based on the preced
ing sections.
I.
Professor Yalof ends where most law professors begin. With a few
exceptions, scholars writing about the appointments process have fo
cused almost exclusively on the Senate's role in confirming Justices.8

6. Terri Jennings Peretti is an Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of
Connecticut.
7. David Alistair Yalof is an Assistant Professor of Political Science, Santa Clara Uni
versity.
8. See sources cited supra note 4; see also John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1 GREENBAG
2d 277, 282-86 (1998) (discussing Senate's discretion in reviewing judicial nominees).
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After reading Yalofs book, one is left with the impression that we
have missed half the picture. As Yalof points out, even with the con
firmation struggles of the last few decades, in the last 100 years the
Senate has approved eighty-nine percent of the President's nominees
to the Supreme Court (p. viii) . Twelve of the last fourteen nominees
to the Court have received Senate approval. "In overemphasizing the
confirmation process we may be neglecting the most critical decision
making stage in most Supreme Court appointments," Yalof argues,
namely the President's selection process (p. viii) . Legal scholars
would be wise to pay attention to the presidency, Yalof continues, be
cause selection and confirmation constitute "a seamless web," in
which mistakes in choosing a nominee may cause a contentious con
firmation (p. viii) .
Seeking to understand the first half of the appointments equation,
Yalof organizes his analysis around case studies of each Supreme
Court nominee from 1945 to 1987, whether they were confirmed or
not. Unlike the rumor-filled snippets one sees in the newspapers, In
Pursuit of Justices establishes a more authoritative record of why can
didates make short lists but not the final cut. Yalof has assembled his
historical account through extensive use of presidential archives and
personal interviews with former presidents, attorneys general, and
White House chiefs of staff and counsels. These short stories provide
reason enough to buy this book, especially for anyone hoping to be
come a Supreme Court Justice. This enticement should place Yalof
on the bestseller list for legal books. If the old saying that every Sena
tor believes that he or she can (and should) become President is true,
then the pool of contenders for a seat on the Supreme Court must be
orders of magnitude larger.
These stories also make for entertaining gossip, at times. One
learns, for example, that President Clinton resisted appointing Justice
Stephen Breyer to Justice White's seat because he felt that "Breyer
was selling himself too hard, that his interests in the law were too nar
row, that he didn't have a big heart."9 According to Yalof, President
Clinton offered the job twice to Secretary of Education Richard Riley,
who turned him down quickly both times (pp. 197-98). In her personal
interview with President Reagan, Yalof reports, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor emphasized her personal opposition to abortion and her
belief that abortion was a legitimate subject for legislative regulation
(p. 140). Yalof indicates that President Kennedy might have chosen
Professor Paul Freund for Justice White's eventual seat, but for his re-

9. P. 200 (citations omitted). Unlike most of Yalofs research, much of the information
concerning the Ointon and Bush administrations relies upon newspaper stories and books
found briefly in the current events section of the bookstore. This, no doubt, is because
presidential archival records are not yet available and administration officials may still feel
some reticence in discussing decisions that occurred so recently.
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fusal to serve as Solicitor General under Robert Kennedy, a rejection
the young Attorney General took personally (p. 77). Apparently,
Freund was persuaded by the advice of Felix Frankfurter that no job,
not even that of Solicitor General, was worth that of a Harvard law
professor, except for that of a Supreme Court Justice (p. 77). On a
more bizarre note, the book indicates that when Chief Justice Burger
retired, young lawyers in the White House Counsel's office removed
Judge Ralph Winter, a well known conservative judge on the Second
Circuit and a law professor at Yale, from consideration, in part be
cause he was "not known for intensive preparation for class" (p. 152;
citations omitted). If that eliminates one for a Supreme Court seat,
many in the law professoriat will have their hopes dashed.10
These stories make In Search of Justices doubly welcome because
they provide a break from much political science work about the
Supreme Court. These days, it seems the fashionable thing is to clas
sify every judicial decision into a few categories, so it can be incorpo
rated into a huge database from which earth-shattering trends are
spotted, like the tendency of Republican appointees to favor the po
lice in criminal procedural cases. Yalof admirably bucks this trend, al
though, as a political scientist, he cannot resist the urge to identify
several factors and frameworks that he believes govern the appoint
ments process. He lists five political factors that constrain a presi
dent's constitutional discretion to nominate whom he chooses: (i) the
timing of a vacancy; (ii) the composition of the Senate; (iii) the presi
dent's public approval ratings; (iv) the outgoing Justice's status and
position on the ideological spectrum; and (v) the realistic pool of can
didates (pp. 4-6).
Yalof follows this up with two more efforts to categorize the judi
cial nomination process. According to the author, Presidents since
1945 have employed three "decisional frameworks" in making
Supreme Court appointments: a) an "open" framework, in which the
selection machinery starts up after a vacancy occurs; b) a "single
candidate focused" framework, in which the President has settled on a
candidate in advance; and c) a "criteria-driven" framework in which
the President sets in advance certain criteria that prospective nomi
nees must meet (p. 6). President Clinton's appointments characterize
open frameworks; President Johnson's choices of Thurgood Marshall
and Abe Fortas fall within the single-candidate framework; and Presi
dent Reagan's nominations of Justice Scalia and Judge Bork meet the
definition of the criteria-driven approach, in which the main factor was
10. As a former student of Judge Winter's in corporations and securities regulation, I
can attest to the fact that whatever these young White House lawyers had thought of Judge
Wmter's level of preparation, he was an effective and successful teacher and mentor to stu
dents. Plus, he told a lot of funny jokes in class, which distinguished him from many of his
colleagues.
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judicial ideology. Yalof then introduces a list of ten factors that he
believes have shaped the modem judicial selection process, which in
cludes developments ranging from the bureaucratization of the Justice
Department, to the expanded power of the Supreme Court, to the rise
of divided government, to the appearance of interest group participa
tion and media attention, to the innovation of computerized legal re
search (pp. 12-18).
Yalof fails to make clear, however, how useful these different
frameworks, factors, and lists are in explaining the success of presiden
tial strategies in selecting Justices. Yalof claims that the open frame
work allows the President more flexibility to respond to the changing
political environment, but that this comes at the price of his or her
long-term goals for the Court, which might be better served by a crite
ria-driven structure. Pursuit of Justices implies that the need to meet
the immediate political environment will require presidents to sacri
fice their judicial agenda. Stripped of all of the frameworks, Yalof's
theory reduces to a study of the usual trade-off between politics and
policy. Yet, Yalof never demonstrates in a satisfying manner whether
his many case studies support these conclusions. In part, Yalof cannot
make this connection because he does not attempt to evaluate presi
dential success in terms of the President's own goals for the Court. He
also leaves the link between the case studies and his frameworks un
made because he often does not (or cannot) recreate the political cost
and-benefit choices that presidents have made in selecting Justices.
Yalof's discussions of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower exem
plify this disconnect between the case studies and the theory. We
learn that Truman's main goal in Supreme Court appointments was
cronyism. Truman sought to nominate only Justices who were part of
his close-knit political circle because he never had any clear agenda
concerning the Supreme Court. Thus, he chose Harold Burton, an old
friend and former Senate colleague, to be an associate Justice, and
Fred Vinson, a poker buddy, to be Chief Justice (pp. 21-33). Yalof
notes that while Truman adopted an open framework, he remained
relatively immune to advice and clearly kept personal control over the
process. Truman's use of an open selection process, therefore, appar
ently made little difference in the ultimate choice of a nominee. Yalof
judges Truman's four Justices to have been mediocre, due to the
president's desire to dominate the nomination process with his per
sonal choices (pp. 39-40). Yet, Yalof does not ask whether Truman's
true goal was to appoint "superlative Justices," in some objective
sense, or whether he simply sought to use the Court as a vehicle for
patronage. If his objective was the latter, then Truman appears to
have satisfied his agenda for the Supreme Court.
Yalof's account of the Eisenhower administration is also unsatis
fying. In response to Truman's cronyism, Eisenhower sought to ap
point "individuals of the highest possible standing" (p. 42; citations
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omitted). Continuing his practice as Supreme Allied Commander
during World War II, Eisenhower delegated considerable authority to
subordinates. In the area of judicial selection, Eisenhower relied upon
his attorney general, Herbert Brownell, to develop the list of candi
dates to be considered. Eisenhower established, however, rigid crite
ria that sought to exclude judicial "left wingers," to use the president's
words, and instead encouraged the appointment of "highly qualified,
moderate" republicans who shared his "middle of the road" political
philosophy (p. 42). He also made clear his desire to nominate candi
dates who were relatively young, so as to outlast a Democratic presi
dential successor, and who had previous judicial experience, so as to
foreclose the potential appointment of New Deal Justices such as
Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas. Quoting historians Gunther Bischof
and Stephen Ambrose, Yalof describes Eisenhower's criteria as "[n]o
senators with a somewhat radical reputation (Black), no allegedly
radical college professors (Frankfurter), no bright young lawyer
professor types who rose to fame as tamers of Wall Street (Douglas)"
(p. 43; citations omitted).
Although Yalof argues that a criteria-driven framework will yield
more principled results, it is unclear whether Eisenhower's appoint
ments achieved the President's Supreme Court agenda. His first two
appointments did not even live up to the framework. Earl Warren re
ceived the Chief Justiceship because Eisenhower had promised him
the first Court vacancy in exchange for Warren's support at a crucial
turning point in the Republican convention of 1952. John Marshall
Harlan received the next nomination because Brownell, his close per
sonal friend, had promised him a seat on the Court. While William
Brennan did not benefit from any personal ties, his appointment re
sulted from the administration's political need to nominate a Catholic;
the Catholic vote had been of critical importance in Eisenhower's 1956
re-election.11 Not only did the Eisenhower administration imperfectly
implement a criteria-driven framework, it is also hard to conclude that
the use of such an approach achieved Eisenhower's goals with regard
to the Supreme Court. To be sure, two of his appointments, Harlan
and Potter Stewart, earned respect in the legal community as "lawyer's
lawyers." Nonetheless, Eisenhower quickly grew frustrated with the
liberal decisions of Warren and Brennan, and though they would be
ranked later as two of the five greatest Justices ever to serve on the
Court, they achieved that fame for reasons that Eisenhower would
have disapproved. Rather than creating a conservative Court,
Eisenhower's method in choosing Justices yielded that great bane of
conservative jurisprudence, the Warren Court.
11. Brennan's name appears to have arisen because Brownell and his deputy had been
impressed by a "rousing" speech that Brennan delivered at the Attorney General's "Confer
ence on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation." See p. 58.
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Yalof's effort to draw clear rules, frameworks, and flowcharts may
be unconvincing because the pool of data is still limited.12 One lesson
emerges, however, that bears significance for the continuing debate
over the appointments process. Viewed with a different point in mind
than Yalof s, the case studies suggest that jurisprudential ideology is
only one of the factors that presidents pursue in nominating Justices.
Indeed, the behind-the-scenes account of judicial selection from
Truman through Clinton indicates that ideological factors rarely pre
dominate over more political or personal factors. Presidents regularly
have chosen Justices for reasons of electoral politics (as in Nixon's de
sire to choose a Southerner), personal friendship, promises, political
imperatives (such as re-election concerns or conserving political capi
tal), or symbolism (choosing the first African American or woman).
The rise of interest groups in the appointments process during the
postwar period exacerbates this phenomenon. Presidents, it seems,
may choose nominees either to placate an interest group or because a
group's sympathizers in either the White House or the Justice De
partment have succeeded in influencing the process. Interest group
participation makes it even less likely that a nominee's selection re
sults purely or even mostly from the President's advancement of his
agenda for the Supreme Court.
This record complicates the arguments made on behalf of presi
dential discretion and senatorial deference in Supreme Court ap
pointments. Supporters of presidential dominance usually claim that
the President's choice of a Justice is entitled to deference because the
President, as the only member of the federal government elected by
the entire nation, enjoys a democratic mandate for advancing his ju
risprudential agenda. While the Senate has a checking role, so this ar
gument goes, it ought to reject only nominees who appear to be un
qualified out of respect for the President's majoritarian support. Even
if this argument were true, it is unclear whether the Senate should con
tinue to defer to presidential choices once it becomes clear that consti
tutional ideology is not the primary factor driving judicial selection. If
Presidents regularly choose Justices for personal or political reasons,
in addition to ideological ones, then the Senate perhaps ought to
ratchet up the intensity of its scrutiny. While we the people may have
voted for a President because we agree with his constitutional views,
that mandate loses its force when the President chooses Justices to
shore up his political support for re-election, or to add to his historical
legacy, or to pass out judicial plums to his friends.13

12 See Martin Shapiro, Interest Groups and Supreme Court Appointments, 84 NW. U. L.
935, 935 {1990) (questioning whether "scientific generalization about Supreme Court
appointments" is possible due to limited set of data).
REV.

13. Of course, one might respond that a winning president ought to reward the interest
groups in his or her coalition that are concerned with judicial selection by appointing their
c:lesired candidate. In part, this conclusion depends on whether one believes that the Presi-
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II.
Unlike Yalof, Peretti is not solely focused on the appointments
process. Rather, her views on Supreme Court appointments grow out
of a broader theory of judicial review and the role of the Court in the
American political system. Peretti believes that criticism of the Court
for judicial activism is misplaced. We should face up to the fact,
Peretti believes, that the Court is a political actor, that its decisions are
political, and that constitutional law merely expresses the normative
preferences of the Justices. According to Peretti, therefore, Presidents
ought to choose Justices solely to advance their political agenda, and
the Senate ought to review nominees based on whether it agrees with
the substantive results they are likely to reach in future cases. We
should welcome, rather than reject, the growing participation of inter
est groups, the media, and political campaign methods in the appoint
ments process. For Peretti, as Clausewitz might put it, the Court is
merely the continuation of politics by other means.
Peretti's argument is logical and straightforward. It finds its gene
sis in the arguments of first the legal realists and then the critical legal
scholars that judicial decisions are, for the most part, indeterminate.
According to Peretti, contemporary constitutional theory has failed to
establish neutral, principled grounds upon which the Supreme Court
can decide any constitutional question. Originalism is unsatisfying be
cause it is too difficult to reconstruct the framers' understanding and,
because all interpretation is open to manipulation, its rules do not
really restrain judicial discretion in a coherent manner (p. 41). Ap
plying noninterpretivist theories, such as those of Ronald Dworkin,
who advocates reliance upon some form of moral philosophy or con
temporary values in reading the Constitution, does no better.14 There
may be no widely shared morals or values in the American political
community; even if they exist, they rest at too abstract a level of gen
erality to prove useful, and judges have little competence in identify
ing them (pp. 42-43). Jesse Choper's and John Hart Ely's process
based theories do not really separate process from substance because

dent and his mandate are, or ought to be, determined by interest group participation, at the
expense of the policy views for which he was elected by the general public. Even if one be
lieved that Presidents are subject to interest group politics in the area of judicial selection
and ideology, there is no constitutional reason that the Senate ought to defer to the outcome
of interest group bargaining on this issue. Indeed, one might conclude that the Senate (al
though itself subject to interest group pressures) ought to react to such a state of affairs by
enhancing the intensity of its scrutiny of nominees in order to reduce the influence of inter
est groups on the judiciary.
14. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE

AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2-38 (1996).
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representation-reinforcing values are easily manipulated and ulti
mately require substantive value choices as well.15
Because no theory has convincingly solved the countermajoritarian
problem, Peretti argues that we should put aside our illusions about
neutral judicial decisionmaking and embrace the notion that not only
are Court decisions political, but that they ought to be. "[V]alue
voting and political motive," Peretti argues, are "both necessary and
legitimate ingredients in constitutional decisionmaking." (p. 77). To
defend her remarkable thesis, she marshals an impressive array of sec
ondary literature, mostly from political science, to show that decisions
based on personal preferences promote democratic values, that the
Court does not suffer losses in legitimacy and power from political de
cisions, and that political judicial decisionmaking enhances political
stability and the dispersion of power. At the very least, Peretti's book
is useful reading for constitutional law scholars who ought to be more
aware of the vast work on the Court as an actor in the national politi
cal system.
In making her claim about the representative nature of the Court,
Peretti makes several striking observations about the appointments
process. Judicial decisionmaking based on political preferences does
not conflict with democracy, Peretti argues. First, political goals drive
judicial selection, and second, Justices often remain true to the politics
of the administration that nominated them. Like Yalof, Peretti high
lights the importance of political motivations in the presidential selec
tion of Justices, such as partisan affiliation and political ideology.
About ninety percent of the judges appointed in each of the last four
administrations, she notes, have come from the same political party as
the President (p. 87). Partisan motives also drive Senate confirmation
practice: the confirmation rate when the President and Senate are of
different parties is significantly lower (fifty-nine percent) than when
they are of the same party (eighty-nine percent), efforts to replace Jus
tices of one party with nominees of the other party double the Senate
rejection rate, and nominations that both effect such partisan re
placements and that alter the ideological balance of the Court appear
to triple the rejection rate (p. 88). Senatorial voting patterns show
that Senators vote to confirm or reject controversial nominees based
upon whether they belong �o the same party as the nominating Presi
dent. Political factors, such as partisan affiliation, presidential political
strength, or ideology, rather than objective merit or qualifications, de
termine whether a Justice receives confirmation. It should be noted

15. Pp. 48-49. Peretti also argues that the more recent "provisional review" theories,
which would escape the possibilities of judicial tyranny by allowing for initial, nonfinal, non
binding Supreme Court decisions, only returns to the familiar interpretivist-noninterpretivist
debate by dra\ving distinctions between Supreme Court decisions that are correct, and hence
are final, and ones that are not.
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that Peretti's account here does not mesh well with Yalof's more di
rect evidence on Supreme Court appointments. According to Yalof,
some Presidents have consciously chosen to emphasize factors other
than ideology, such as political cronyism, in choosing their Justices.
Peretti's approach to the Court and its Justices cannot account for the
actual record on presidential selection of Justices.
Nonetheless, Peretti faces a significant obstacle in her explanation
of the political nature of the appointments process. One should see
far less struggle between the President and the Senate over Supreme
Court appointments, the Rehnquist, Bork, and Thomas nomination
fights notwithstanding, if she were correct that judicial selection was
simply subject to the same political process that governed, for exam
ple, legislation or administrative rulemaking. Given the divided gov
ei.-nment that generally has prevailed in the postwar period, Peretti's
thesis would have predicted substantial political controversy over the
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter nominations. Nonetheless, while the
Senate has rejected twenty percent of all Supreme Court nominees in
its history, only five nominees have failed to win Senate confirmation
in the twentieth century (p. 94). Peretti attempts to downplay this
evidence by arguing that recent Presidents have adjusted their nomi
nations, depending on the power of the opposition party in the Senate,
in order to reduce confrontation with the Senate and to conserve their
political power. Ultimately, she admits, as she must, that "the compe
tition between the Senate and president has not, in recent years, been
as vigorous or as balanced as it should be to insure the Court's repre
sentativeness" (p. 99).
Putting this problem to one side, Peretti then advances the argu
ment that political representation on the Court translates into politi
cally sensitive decisionmaking by the Justices. According to Peretti,
"the link between the value premises of a Justice's selection and then
the value premises of her subsequent decisions is significant and con
sequential and constitutes an indirect form of political representation"
(p. 84). Justices apparently dance with the person who brought them
to the party. Surveying a rich political science literature (known pri
marily as the "attitudinal" model), Peretti observes that a strong link
exists between a Justice's personal values and his or her decisions over
time. Despite occasional surprises, presidents choose nominees be
cause they know a candidate's values and they predict that the nomi
nee will advance a desired ideology once on the bench. Peretti finds
that at least three-quarters of the Justices generally satisfy presidential
expectations about their judicial performance (pp. 130-31). The ma
jority of these Justices prove successful because presidents used their
appointments as an opportunity to extend their policy influence into
the future. Presidents who are "surprised" by a nominee's future deci
sions usually failed to evaluate carefully a nominee's political views, as
when President Madison appointed Joseph Story, or were subject to
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constraints generated by other political leaders or by political condi
tions when they selected a nominee.
Peretti spends a great deal of effort establishing a link between
presidential policy goals and judicial voting patterns because the rep
resentative nature of the Court is key to proving the rest of her thesis.
Only by showing that the personal values that guide a Justice's deci
sions are connected to the values that the President (and Senate) vali
dated in appointing the nominee can In Defense of a Political Court
make its normative claim that value-voting by the Justices has any ba
sis in democratic theory. Yalof's evidence, however, seems to throw a
monkey wrench into Peretti's finely tuned model, as it seems clear
from his case studies that Presidents have chosen only a few nominees
because of agreement with their ideological views. Nonetheless, for
Peretti, voting by personal preference allows the Justices to "reflect or
represent the political values and policy views currently (or at a mini
mum recently) receiving official expression and representation in
other branches of government and, by inference, receiving a signifi
cant measure of popular support" (p. 131). By voting their personal
preferences, Peretti argues, Justices counterintuitively advance demo
cratic control over judicial decisionmaking. She fails to explain, how
ever, how this occurs as Justices become farther removed from the
time of their appointment. Nor does Peretti allow any room for the
case of Justices who change their jurisprudential views over time.
The rest of the book seeks to defend this paradoxical judicial role
both by taking apart age-old criticisms of a political Court and by de
fending the Court's activities as appropriate in a pluralist political sys
tem. Peretti argues that judicial decisions are not all that threatening
because the Court's power is easily checked by impeachment, congres
sional control over the Court's size and jurisdiction, constitutional and
statutory amendment, the appointments process, and its need for the
cooperation of the other branches for implementation of its decisions
(pp. 137-47). Peretti's list only highlights the importance of appoint
ments, however, as her other techniques for political control over the
Court are rarely used and are highly controversial. Peretti discards
the claim that political decisionmaking by the Justices will erode the
Court's legitimacy by pointing out that public awareness of the Court's
decisions or of the Justices is low,16 that most Americans do not hold
the Court as an institution in especially high regard, and that judicial
decisions that violate some generally held ideals of impartial deci
sionmaking do not erode public support for the Court (pp. 173-80).
Therefore, the more political the Court is, the more its decisions are
politically responsive to views of the public and national elites, and the

16. In 1989, for example, a public opinion poll showed that only 9 percent of Americans
could correctly name Rehnquist as Chief Justice, while 54 percent knew that Judge Wapner
was the jurist on the television show, The People's Court.
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more likely the Court will receive the political support necessary to
preserve its authority.•
Peretti reserves the end of her book for the two most difficult
challenges to her analysis. First, she addresses the criticism that a po
litical Court, however vague its representative nature, still acts in con
flict with democratic values. In responding to this claim, she star
tlingly embraces pluralist theory. Relying upon the theories of Robert
Dahl, Peretti argues that regular elections and the legislative process
are imperfect transmitters of majoritarian preferences, and that in
stead we ought to view the national political system as promoting a
pluralist structure in which diverse groups have the opportunity to
challenge and influence government decisionmaking.
Under this
model, a political Court becomes merely "an alternative arena in
which dissatisfaction with legislative or administrative decisions can be
aired" (p. 219). The democratic legitimacy of the Court's authority is
not important; what counts is that the Court establishes a different
avenue for citizen and group desires to express themselves, and ulti
mately for widespread consensus for government decisions to be gen
erated.
Peretti's second challenge arises from the first. If a political Court
serves only as another forum in a pluralist system, why vest any power
in such a redundant body at all? Her answer takes two parts. First,
the Court provides a forum for groups that might be systematically ex
cluded from the political process. Here, it is hard to distinguish her
argument from the theories of Carolene Products, Jesse Choper, and
John Hart Ely, which she had criticized earlier in the book. Second,
the Court serves as an important fine-tuning instrument in the public
policy process. It more precisely fashions public policies to specific
situations and provides a feedback mechanism to the lawmakers.
In honestly addressing these questions, Peretti deserves much
praise. Peretti is an obvious fan, if not a card-carrying member, of the
critical legal studies ("CLS") movement.17 CLS criticisms of the myth
of objectivity in constitutional law, as in other areas of law, have value,
but they have suffered from several shortcomings. Most glaringly,
CLS has failed to promote any positive solution to replace the results
of its attack in all directions on the objectivity and neutrality of law.
For that reason, my colleague Phillip Johnson has compared critical
legal studies to the work of an adolescent who revels in criticizing eve
rything, but solving nothing.18 CLS work on constitutional law reduces
to an utterly result-driven enterprise in which achieving utopian social
visions amounts to the only guide to legal decisionmaking. Peretti's

17. See pp. 36-45 (finding convincing CLS claims of "judicial subjectivity" and "constitu
tional indeterminacy").
18. See Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be a Radical?, 36 STAN. L . REV.
247, 248 (1984).
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work represents a serious effort to avoid this problem by sketching out
a positive role for the Court in a CLS world where law really is noth
ing more than politics.
Despite this worthy effort, Peretti's work does not fully satisfy. If
the law really is just politics, then constitutional law serves only as the
expression of temporary policy preferences. By advancing its own
ideological agenda, the Court merely serves as the means for that ex
pression. Many constitutional law scholars will find it difficult to agree
with this conclusion because Peretti's approach allows for no objective
judgment or criticism of a judicial decision.19 Peretti must acknowl
edge, therefore, that not only was the Lochner Court right, since it ex
pressed the political views of the Justices of its day, but so too were
the Courts of Dred Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Korematsu, among
others. If the Court is playing politics, and the political system allows
the Court to pursue its agenda, then what the Court decides is, ipse
dixit, constitutional. CLS-inspired analysis of constitutional law, ironi
cally, devolves into a defense of the status quo, in that if law is just
politics, then the problem is with the national society and culture and
its preferences, rather than with constitutional law. Agreement with
the notion that the law represents only the product of collective politi
cal, social, and cultural preferences that allow elites to dominate soci
ety means that there is not all that much any of us can do to reform
the law or the Court.
Even if Peretti were right that constitutional law is just the
continuation of politics by other means, she still fails to offer a
convincing reason why we ought to vest any authority in the judicial
branch. If the Court's function is purely political, it is difficult to see
why we should not replace the Court with an alternative forum for the
expression of group preferences, such as an agency or congressional
office. Peretti offers no reason to think that judges are especially
adept at performing the pluralist role she imposes on them; indeed,
due to their isolation from the political system, they might be
exceptionally inept at performing this function. Her answer that the
Court has a distinctive role in fine-tuning public policy is not
compelling in light of the record of the courts in frustrating and
distorting the implementation of public policy in the United States.20
Further, as recent works by Gerald Rosenberg21 and Michael

19. Admitting this, she declares that there "are simply no absolute imperatives about
the particular values or group interests that the Court must advance and protect." P. 233.
20. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J.
POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991); see also JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS:
How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PuBLIC POLICY (1989).
21. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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Klarman22 have argued, the Court does a poor job of achieving social
change, and, as some have maintained, the federal courts suffer from a
number of structural difficulties in implementing their constitutional
visions in a complex society.23 The inescapable conclusion to Peretti's
analysis seems to be that we ought to take away any public policy
function from the courts.
Peretti's inability to offer a better explanation for the role of a po
litical Court highlights a critical non sequitur in her argument. Even if
the grounds for judicial decisionmaking were substantially indetermi
nate, it does not follow that the Court's role must be understood
within a pluralist framework. In Defense of a Political Court provides
no defense for the choice of the theory of Robert Dahl over those of
John Rawls or Karl Marx. While Peretti has emptied judicial review
of the idea of neutral constitutional adjudication, she simply has re
placed it with yet another theory, that of seeking political stability
through pluralist consensus-building, with little effort at explanation.
Further, Peretti confuses pluralism's descriptive enterprise for norma
tive justifications. It may be the case that much of modern American
politics can be explained through the lens of interest group politics, al
though institutionalist and positive political theory work may have
thrown this conclusion into doubt. Nonetheless, Peretti fails to ex
plain why the Supreme Court or the other branches of government
ought to adopt pluralism's normative goals - political stability, mod
erate policy choices, and social satisfaction - rather than other possi
ble values in public lawmaking, such as social justice, rational policy
choice, economic efficiency, or republican deliberation. Left-wing
thinkers, for example, have criticized pluralism for centralizing politi
cal power in social elites, for pacifying groups oppressed by the capi
talist system, and generally for suppressing other forms of political
struggle based on broader classifications than mere interest groups.24
Peretti adopts CLS methods to show that all law is indeterminate, but
she provides no defense of her choice of political values in response to
criticism from the same quarter.
In Defense of a Political Court proves ultimately unsatisfying
because of its barren vision of the Constitution. If constitutional law
becomes only the personal preferences of the Justices, then the
Constitution itself does not impose limitations upon government

22. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
L. REV. 7 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revo
lutions, 82 vA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
23. See, e.g., John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Re
medial Authority ofthe Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123, 1137-41 (1996).
24. See, e.g., William E. Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF
3 (William E. Connolly ed., 1969); Frank Cunningham, Pluralism and Class
Struggle, 39 SCI. & SOC'Y 385, 415-16 (1975-76).
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power. For Peretti, the Court and the political branches might limit
the breadth and depth of government action, but only for political
reasons. If the people today believe that we should do away with
federalism and the separation of powers, Peretti would not let the
Constitution stand in the way. If the Court permitted the national
government to harm racial minority groups, Peretti provides us with
no way to dispute the constitutionality of that act. According to In
Defense of a Political Court, the Constitution exerts no real binding
force on prosecutors and police in their handling of suspects and
defendants, it imposes no rules on government treatment of religious
groups, and it provides no real guarantees for rights of due process or
privacy. Not only is it impossible for us to judge the correctness of
Chief Justice Taney's decision in Dred Scott, we cannot even decide
whether we agree with the dissent or with Abraham Lincoln's
criticisms of the case, aside from expressing our opposition to slavery
on political or moral grounds.
While In Defense of a Political Court admirably remains true to its
initial intellectual assumptions, its conclusions on this score suggest
that its initial observations were not as compelling as at first glance.
To be sure, it seems undeniable that personal values have driven some
of the decisions of some of the Justices. Yet, Peretti has not shown
(which I think that she must) that Justices have value-voted in every
case. One can identify many examples where Justices voted against
their personal preferences because they believed that the Constitution
required a different result.25 While there may be many people whose
actions and understandings are caught in the amber of the dominant
values in our society, Justices are probably the actors with the most
Peretti also goes too far in
freedom to defy those structures.
suggesting that the Constitution lacks meaning and force except as one
norm among many others.
There are many things that the
government today does not attempt because of the Constitution's
requirements. For the most part, the government has not restricted
political speech in our history, it still operates within the broad
outlines of the original separation of powers, and states still enjoy
some elements of sovereignty. To be sure, this is a difficult point for
Peretti to prove because it is impossible to demonstrate how
American history would have been different if there had been only an
utterly malleable Constitution.
Nonetheless, despite the many
adjustments to, and modifications of, constitutional meaning over the
last two centuries, many of the outlines of the original Constitution
remain today.
·

25. Some cases where Justices probably voted against their preferences on the merits of
the public policy issues at stake include Justice Scalia in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
{1989) (concerning flag burning), Chief Justice Rehnquist in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
{1988) (concerning the authority of independent counsel), and Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (concerning abortion).
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Rather than devoting so much energy toward showing that there is
no such thing as constitutional law, Peretti might have more usefully
asked why there is so much constitutional law all around us. If Peretti
were correct that constitutional law really boils down to personal pref
erences and political ideologies, we should have dispensed with the
Constitution a long time ago, given the temptations and political im
peratives that have arisen in the nation's history. Peretti's theory of
law as politics cannot explain why a European welfare state model of
government did not fully emerge in the wake of the Great Depression,
or why the United States has never witnessed successful communist,
socialist, or religious political parties. Peretti cannot explain why we
still have a separation of powers, despite the emergence of an adminis
trative state, or why we still have sovereign states, even with the na
tionalization of markets and society.26
The answer to these questions, some have suggested, is that the
Constitution establishes enduring norms that impose observable limits
on government authority. This should not be surprising. As a multi
cultural society constantly replenished by successive waves of immi
gration, the American people do not share a common genealogical,
cultural, religious or geographic heritage. If there is anything that
binds the many different groups that make up the American people, it
is the Constitution, which serves as America's civic religion. Interest
groups may vie for influence in a pluralist system in which the Court is
a political actor, but the Justices (as well as the other actors in the po
litical system) may not enjoy the political freedom to value-vote, as
Peretti would have it, because they have already internalized the Con
stitution's values of the separation of powers, federalism, and individ
ual rights. Put a different way, Peretti's theory views preferences as
independent of political activity; what she fails to understand is that
the Constitution itself, as well as the act of engaging in political delib
eration, may generate and shape preferences.
All of this is not to say that Justices do not pursue ideological or
political agendas on the Court. What Peretti has confused, however, is
the difference between politics broadly defined and differences over
judicial ideology. Peretti believes not only that Justices have specific
preferences on policy questions such as social security, taxes, and in
ternational relations, but also that they pursue their goals by voting
their beliefs. Current Justices, it seems to me, do not vote in most
cases because they agree with a legislature or agency's outcome on a
specific policy question, but rather they take account of broader con
siderations abut the proper role of the Court, vis-a-vis the other
branches and the states, in public lawmaking and in interpreting the
Constitution. To borrow the distinction made by H.L.A. Hart, Jus-

26. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism, Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).

May 2000]

Choosing Justices

1453

tices pursue their own ideology considering the rules of recognition the process by which society makes laws - rather than the substantive
rules - themselves.27 Thus, the Justices may have different personal
attitudes toward affirmative action or abortion or the death penalty,
but these views need not correlate with their votes on how much def
erence the judiciary ought to provide to Congress, or how far the Bill
of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments go in removing certain
issues from the control of either the states or the federal government.
While these disputes, no doubt, are political or ideological, they form
a far more narrow category that excludes the wider philosophical,
moral, intellectual, or partisan differences that shape politicians' and
people's views on policy questions.
Issues of judicial ideology, as opposed to general policy conflicts,
do not pose the same concerns about the comparative political incom
petence or the unrepresentative nature of the Court. As opposed to
questions of policy that require political leaders to represent the pol
icy's values, or that involve choices between different social costs and
benefits, questions of legal and constitutional dimension - such as
what branches should make certain decisions, what decisions are re
moved from politics completely, or what institutional procedures are
necessary to promote the rule of law - seem to fall within the special
competence of judges and lawyers. Indeed these questions may be the
very "political" questions that are best suited for judicial resolution.
By focusing on only broader political value-voting, Peretti fails to see
that more subtle differences over judicial and constitutional ideology
can be particularly legal and not just a subterfuge for politics-as-usual.
The next Part will show why judicial ideology bears particular impor
tance for the appointments process.
III.
Despite these difficulties with her law-as-politics thesis, Peretti
makes the important contribution of clarifying how we ought to think
about the judicial appointments process. After the Bork and Thomas
confirmation hearings, scholars reached a stopping point in their
analysis of the relative roles of the Senate and President. Henry
Monaghan nicely expresses the reigning scholarly consensus; after ex
amining the constitutional text, structure, and history, he finds no con
stitutional barriers that restrict the Senate's freedom in examining a
nominee's judicial or political ideology.28 Once Monaghan acknowl-

27. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91-96 (1961).
28. See Henry Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1202, 1207 (1988); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, Straightening Out
the Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549, 562 (1995); Charles Black, A Note on Senatorial
Consideration ofSupreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970).
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edges that politics govern the appointments process, there is not much
more for the law to say. Differing only slightly from Monaghan's basic
conclusions, other prominent legal scholars have urged the Senate to
consider more than qualifications in the confirmation process. Some,
like Laurence Tribe, argue that the Senate ought to articulate its own
vision of constitutional law and enforce it through confirmations,29
while others, such as Stephen Carter, believe that the Senate ought to
examine nominees for their moral character.30 Robert Nagel, who ac
cepts a norm of substantive, ideological review by the Senate, believes
that confirmation hearings present the opportunity for legal thinking
to be exposed to political values and forms of discourse so that the
Justices can understand the political consequences of their decisions.31
Many of these conclusions seem driven by the idea that if the Jus
tices are acting as the legal realists would predict, then the Senate
ought to intervene more aggressively in examining a nominee's per
sonal views. Although In Defense of a Political Court begins with that
assumption, it skillfully moves beyond it. Peretti's signal contribution
is her effort to link the appointments process not just to how we think
Justices make decisions, but also to our understanding of the role of
the Court in the political system. As a normative matter, the Senate's
approach to appointments should reflect the grounds upon which judi
cial review is based, and the manner in which the other branches re
spond to its exercise. It is not enough, as previous writers have done,
to declare that the Constitution imposes no standards on the President
or Senate in choosing their nominees, and then to throw up one's
hands in despair. As I have argued elsewhere, based on my experi
ence serving as General Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
even when the Constitution does not impose specific standards to
guide government officials, the members of the political branches still
develop quasi-constitutional norms to limit the exercise of their ple
nary or discretionary functions.32 We should seek to determine the ba
sis of judicial review and its role in the political system, and then infer
from that relationship the quasi-constitutional norms that should
guide the President and Senate in choosing Justices.
The first step in this analysis is to understand the significant change
in the nature of judicial review that began during the Warren Court
and has accelerated during the Rehnquist years. Initially, judicial re
view was a modest doctrine based on a narrow reading of the Court's
powers. In Marbury v. Madison,33 Chief Justice John Marshall did not

29. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 131 (1985).
30. See Carter, supra note 2, at 1199.
31. See Nagel, supra note 3, at 873.
32 See John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
at 1, 16-18.
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

PROBS., Spring

1998,

1455

Choosing Justices

May 2000]

invalidate Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 because the Court
had an important role in settling great political questions or in articu
lating social norms. Rather, judicial review arose from the nature of a
written Constitution and the Court's role in resolving cases and con
troversies involving federal law. It was inevitable, Marshall noted,
that cases brought to the Court would raise conflicts between statutes
and claims based on the Constitution. As a written document adopted
through popular ratification, the Constitution expressed higher law
that superseded any ordinary legislative enactment. Therefore, in de
ciding a case between two parties, Marshall concluded, the Court had
to give effect to the higher law of the Constitution over more ephem
eral legislation.
[I]f both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that
the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disre
garding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding
the law . . . the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then the
courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordi
34
nary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

Judicial review springs from the judiciary's unique fµnction in deciding
cases or controversies under federal law.35
Marbury's grounding of judicial review in the Court's case
deciding function left ample room for the other branches to engage in
constitutional interpretation while performing their own constitutional
duties. This departmentalist understanding of constitutional review
recognizes that the President and Senate may use their own plenary
powers to restrict, frustrate, or challenge the decisions of the Court.
Often associated with Thomas Jefferson, this theory of concurrent re
view assumes that each branch of the government is coordinate, equal,
and supreme within its own sphere of action.36 President Jefferson, for
example, enforced his belief that the Alien and Sedition Acts were un
constitutional by refusing to prosecute offenders. As he wrote to
Abigail Adams,
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of
the sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right
to decide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for

34. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
35. See
(1989).

ROBERT L.

CLINTON, MARBURY v. MADISON AND

JUDICIAL

REVIEW 15-17

36. See id.; CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 94-96
(1986); Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law ls, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 228-38, 255-62 (1994).

1456

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1436

them. Both magistracies are equally independent in the sphere of action
assigned to them.37

Jefferson articulated the same theory in considering whether to resist
Marshall's subpoena for papers involving the Burr conspiracy.38 Fol
lowing the departmentalist understanding of judicial review, President
Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill to incorporate the Bank of the United
States, even though the Supreme Court had held in McCulloch v.
Maryland that Congress could establish the Bank under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.39 Wrote Jackson: "The Congress, the Executive,
and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the
Constitution. "40
Judicial review's originally modest grounds also leave a legitimate
avenue for resistance to Supreme Court decisions. If the Court has
embarked on a direction that is unfaithful to the Constitution, the
people can act through the other branches of government to forestall
the Court in the hopes that it may reverse itself.
As President
Abraham Lincoln declared in his first inaugural address, "I do not for
get the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to
be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions
must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object
of that suit."41 Nonetheless, he continued, "the evil effect following
[an erroneous decision], being limited to that particular case, with the
chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for
other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different
practice."42 Because the effects of judicial review are limited to the
case presented, Lincoln even suggests that the Court's decisions apply
only to the parties, and not to other citizens who might disagree - an
argument Lincoln made at least as early as his debates with Senator
Douglas over Dred Scott. To allow Court decisions to have a broader
effect, Lincoln concluded, would deprive the people of the right of
self-government. " [I]f the policy of the government upon vital ques
tions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions
of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation
between parties in personal actions," he declared, "the people will

37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, Sept. 11, 1804, in 10
(Paul L. Ford ed., 1905).

WORKS OF

v.

Nixon, and

THOMAS JEFFERSON 89 n.1

38. See John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States
Presidential Power, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1435, 1449-50 (1999).
39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).

40. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, in 2 JAMES D. RICHARDSON,
COMPILATION OF THE MEsSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 582 (1896).

A

41. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1861, in 6 JAMES D.
A COMPILATION OF THE MEsSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 9
(1896).
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have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically re
signed their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal."43
This Jefferson-Lincoln view of judicial power, one consistent with
the reasoning of Marbury, bears several implications for the selection
of Supreme Court Justices. Coordinate constitutional review reduces
the importance of appointments to the Court. If the Court's decisions
do not extend so broadly as to bind other government actors, and if
the other branches play an equal, coordinate role in making constitu
tional law, then it may not be as important that the Court serve a rep
resentative function. As the Court is not irrevocably fixing "the policy
of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people,"
democratic government may not require that the Justices act in sync
with the elected branches or with popular wishes. Further, the narrow
scope of judicial review allows the people to resort to other political
avenues, such as the executive or legislative branches, to correct erro
neous (or undesired) Court decisions. While the Court may still act in
a countermajoritarian manner, its reach is limited to individual cases.
If the Court has interpreted the Constitution in a way that is accept
able to the political system, then its norms will spread throughout not
just the judiciary, but the political branches as well. If not, then oppo
nents can turn to the political system to challenge, narrow, and per
haps overturn the effects of a Court decision. This reduces the need to
resort to the appointments process as a second-best method for re
versing the Court's long-term policy direction. Rather, the President
and Senate can seek nominees who excel at deciding cases, the pri
mary purpose for the federal courts.
Interest in the ideological positions of nominees, however, be
comes increasingly significant to the political branches once their free
dom to interpret the Constitution comes under challenge. Many aca
demics, such as Carter, Nagel, and Peretti, view the recent struggle
over the appointments process as an almost inevitable consequence of
the expansion of judicial review to many of the social issues of the day.
There is much truth to this observation, but it is not the only change in
judicial review that has contributed to the politicization of the ap
pointments process. Of equal, if not greater, importance has been the
Court's movement toward judicial supremacy in recent decades. The
Court's expansion into areas of social concern, standing alone, does
not seem sufficient to generate all of the political controversy over ju
dicial nominations, given the record of limited compliance with Su
preme Court decisions. Judicial resolution of questions concerning
privacy, criminal rights, and race relations may explain why different
groups display interest in Court nominations, but not why the leaders
of the other branches of government do. Previous historical periods,

43. Id.
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in which the Court played a central role in national controversies, such
as those over the national bank, the extent of Reconstruction, or gov
ernment regulation of the economy, did not witness the rise of politi
cal interest in the ideology of nominees to the Court (as opposed to
those of the sitting Justices) that characterized the Bork nomination.
While the New Deal period did focus political attention on the ideol
ogy of nominees, this was a single-issue concern - whether nominees
supported the expansion of federal power during the Great Depres
sion - rather than a consideration of a nominee's broader views on
policy or even constitutional theory. Until Judge Bork, it appears that
the Senate had never rejected a Supreme Court nominee because of
his jurisprudential views.44
All of that has changed, and it seems that the Court's recent effort
to transform judicial review into a doctrine of judicial supremacy is an
indispensable contributing factor. The emergence of judicial suprem
acy certainly seems to have occurred at the same time as the rise of in
terest in the ideological views of the Justices. Marbury v. Madison, as
noted above, did not rest on a claim that the Court had the final, de
finitive say on interpreting the Constitution, only that its power to de
clare laws unconstitutional arose from its duty to decide cases. It was
not until Cooper v. Aaron in 1958 that the Court first clearly declared
that its interpretations of the Constitution bound all other government
officials.45 Not only did the Court declare that its opinions were the
"supreme Law of the Land," but that it was "supreme in the exposi
tion" of the Constitution.46 Cooper identified the Constitution with
the Court's decisions as well as with the constitutional text. Commen
tators at the time launched scathing attacks upon the Court's claim,47
although some more recently have sought to defend Cooper as neces
sary to ensure compliance by state officials with Brown v. Board of
Education.48 Indeed, the Court's declaration of its own supremacy did
little to overcome the massive resistance to Brown by state and local

44. See NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS:
JUDGE BORI< AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 37-50 (1998).

45. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
46. Id. at 18.
47. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 259-64 (1962); PHILIP KURLAND, POLITICS, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 116 (1970); Henry Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: the Who and When, 82 YALE LJ. 1363, 1363 n.2 (1973); J. Harvie Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970, 64 VA. L. REV. 485, 520
(1978).
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule ofLaw:
Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387.
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officials, which did not begin to wane until the late 1960s with more
vigorous enforcement of civil rights by the political branches.49
While the Warren Court may not have truly claimed supremacy
over the coordinate branches, its more conservative successors took
the next step. In United States v. Nixon, the Burger Court claimed for
itself the right to make final determinations on the scope of executive
privilege, found that the judiciary's constitutional need for the Water
gate tapes superseded the executive branch's desire for secrecy, and
ordered President Nixon to produce the tapes.50 While recognizing
that the President enjoyed an executive privilege in limited cases, the
Court held that the President could not impose an absolute shield on
all communications with his subordinates. Rather, secrecy in execu
tive communications had to yield to the judiciary's need for informa
tion to conduct criminal trials. Most importantly, the Court rejected
the claim that the President possessed the constitutional authority to
determine independently questions of executive privilege. Where
Cooper established judicial supremacy over the states, Nixon extended
it to the Presidency. One might argue, as the Nixon Court did, that
Nixon only applied the rules of Marbury. In Marbury, however, the
Court did not issue an order to an executive official, nor did it claim
that its interpretation of the Constitution in the course of doing so
would be supreme.
Despite its alleged efforts to reverse the Warren Court revolution,
the Rehnquist Court has actually expanded the judiciary's claims to
supremacy. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,51 the Court reaffirmed
the core holding of Roe v. Wade: that a constitutional right to privacy
included a woman's right to an abortion. Declaring its resistance to
political and popular efforts to reverse Roe, the unprecedented plu
rality decision seemed to tie the Court's legitimacy and power to the
very idea of the rule of law. "To all those who will be so tested by
following, the Court implicitly undertakes to remain steadfast, lest in
the end a price be paid for nothing," the plurality of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter declared.52
So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live
according to the rule of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people
is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court invested

49. The Court would not seek vigorous enforcement of Brown v. Board of Education
until Congress had enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
50. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
51. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
52 Id. at 868.
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with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before
all others for their constitutional ideals.53

In Casey, the plurality argued that its right to decide cases was more
than that; its power to interpret the Constitution was the power to
"callO the contending sides of a national controversy to end their na
tional division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Consti
tution."54 The Casey Court argued that due to the Court's supreme
power to decide constitutional questions, the other branches, and the
people, had to accept the judiciary's resolution of great political and
social questions, and end their efforts at resistance.
While one might dismiss Casey as the excessive rhetoric of a plu
rality, City of Boerne v. Flores55 made clear the Rehnquist Court's be
lief in its own supremacy. In response to Employment Division v.
Smith,56 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA")57 to restore the strict standard of review for laws that bur
den free exercise rights. It claimed the authority under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to decree the substance of the Bill of
Rights as they applied to the states. The Court, however, rejected a
congressional role in interpreting the Bill of Rights at variance with its
decisions. "As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substan
tive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, are self-executing," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court.58
"The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy re
mains in the Judiciary."59 Dispelling any doubt about its plenary pow
ers, the Court emphasized that it exercises "primary authority to in
terpret" the Constitution's prohibitions on government action.60
According to the Court, Congress can only enact remedial legislation
to enforce the Bill of Rights, as interpreted by the judiciary. Last
term, in United States v. Morrison,61 the Court reaffirmed the logic of
Boerne by striking down a statute that provided a civil remedy for
violence against women. No Justice has dissented from the judicial
supremacy holdings of either Boerne or its progeny.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 867.
55. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral, generally applicable laws may restrict re·
ligious practices even when not supported by a compelling government interest).
57. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb bb-4 (1994).
·

58. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 524.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 120 S. Ct. 1720 (2000); see also United States v. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)
(invalidating federal statute that attempted to reverse Miranda warnings).
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For all of the concern over a conservative judicial counter
revolution, on the issue of judicial supremacy the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have fully embraced and even expanded Cooper.
Where Cooper announced that the Court's interpretations of the Con
stitution bound state officials, a result possibly consistent with the de
partmentalist approach to constitutional review, Nixon and Boerne
expanded the Court's supremacy over the coordinate political
branches. Casey suggested that the Court's decisions even precluded
citizens and groups from actively dissenting from judicial interpreta
tion of the Constitution. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts' aggres
sive rhetoric has not been the only distinctive characteristic of the re
cent rise of judicial supremacy; the surrender of the other branches
has proven truly remarkable. In the Watergate Tapes case, President
Nixon readily complied with the Court's demand for production. Two
decades later, President Clinton failed to challenge the Court's su
premacy in determining the boundaries of executive privilege in
Clinton v. Jones. Despite the nearly unanimous support in Congress
for RFRA, Congress obeyed the Court's decision and has not yet en
acted another statute challenging Smith. Congress has not even at
tempted to employ its own plenary powers, such as through the
Spending or Commerce Clause, to convince states to protect religious
liberty.62 To be sure, one might claim that the notion of judicial su
premacy had gained wider acceptance throughout society well before
Cooper, Nixon, Casey, and Boerne, because of the need to have a final
resolver of constitutional uncertainty. It is unclear, however, when
this idea firmly took root in the absence of judicial decisions that ar
ticulated the concept and put it into practice.
Judicial supremacy changes the constitutional structure in a way
that leads to the more political appointments process that we have to
day. Ending departmentalism closes off many of the valid methods for
resistance to the Court's decisions. As demonstrated by the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, Jefferson and Madison believed
that states could declare their opposition to unconstitutional actions of
the federal government. It is still a matter of historical dispute
whether they believed that the states could go farther in interposing or
nullifying unconstitutional federal laws.63 Cooper and, more impor
tantly, Casey have formally blocked off that avenue of resistance.
Several Presidents, including not just Jefferson and Lincoln, but also

62 See Jesse H. Choper, On the Difference in Importance Between Supreme Court Doc
trine and Actual Consequences: A Review of the Supreme Court's 1996-97 Term, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 2259 (1998) (proposing ways to enact a religious freedom statute after
Boerne).

63. For an interesting discussion of the differences between Jefferson and Madison on
this point, and its relevance to the political struggle over nullification, see DREW MCCOY,
THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGAcY 139-51
{1989).
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Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt, believed that the other
branches of government could take action, at odds with the Supreme
Court, based on their own interpretation of the Constitution. Nixon
and Boerne have formally eliminated the possibility that the coordi
nate branches can use their powers to resist and frustrate Court deci
sions. According to Casey, at some point even the people must cease
their struggles and accept the Court's resolution of a controversial
constitutional issue. To be sure, the Court's decisions cannot force the
states, the other branches, or the people from challenging Supreme
Court decisions. Nonetheless, these decisions declare such action to
be constitutionally illegitimate and a virtual attack on the rule of law.
Foreclosing the legitimate methods for resisting Court decisions
naturally leads to the politicization of the appointments process.
When the Court decides to invalidate moral, social, or economic leg
islation as unconstitutional, it has removed an area of policymaking
from the political arena. Judicial supremacy, as advanced by the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, seeks to remove any legiti
mate methods using the coordinate political branches or the states to
challenge this transfer of issues from the political to the legal sphere.
Once individuals and groups cannot turn to their elected representa
tives or even to their own efforts at direct action to promote their con
stitutional visions, they must turn to the appointments process to
change the direction of the Supreme Court. Efforts to inject politics
into the selection of judicial nominees actually embody the polity's
ongoing discussion concerning the values that will govern society. By
constitutionalizing more areas of life, and by pursuing the notion of
judicial supremacy, the Court itself has shunted normal political activ
ity from the world of policy into the world of Court appointments.
Indeed, the Court's claim to supremacy may also have triggered
the emergence of political campaigning techniques in the appoint
ments process. In seeking to reverse undesirable Court decisions,
players in the political process (not just interest groups, but also politi
cal parties and individual members of the House and Senate) must go
farther than merely altering the Court's jurisprudential instincts. They
also must seek the appointment of individuals who are likely to re
verse particular decisions and doctrines. This is no easy task because
individuals do not resemble legislation, which can be assembled piece
by piece to achieve consensus, and they cannot be recalled once con
firmed. This difficulty in reversing Court decisions, in contrast to the
more precise methods offered by presidential order or congressional
statute, may explain (without justifying) why different political actors
have employed such exaggerated claims and aggressive tactics in sup
porting or opposing Court nominees.
These two approaches to the role of courts yield different implica
tions for the appointment process. Under a theory of coordinate con
stitutional review, in which each branch of government interprets the
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Constitution in the course of executing its own duties, a President and
Senate can focus upon appointing judges who demonstrate the quali
ties of outstanding lawyers. According to Marbury, Jefferson, and
Lincoln, constitutional interpretation arises from the judiciary's pri
mary function of deciding cases. Therefore, the President and Senate
should strive to select nominees whose qualifications and records sug
gest that they would excel at deciding cases in as impartial a manner as
possible, by practicing the lawyerly craft according to the best stan
dards of the legal profession. This is not a plea for common law con
stitutionalism in judicial selection, or an argument on behalf of judicial
minimalism.64 One can select Justices who both excel at practicing the
lawyer's craft and are capable of developing a broad constitutional vi
sion, such as Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story.65 Rather, the
originally modest grounds for judicial review suggest that the ap
pointments process should seek those whose background, character,
and qualifications suggest that they would make impartial adjudicators
of disputes.
A system of coordinate constitutional review reduces the impor
tance of judicial appointments in the political system. Selecting superb
lawyers makes it less likely that the Court will expand beyond its func
tion of dispute resolution into that of final constitutional arbiter. On
this understanding, leading politicians or constitutional law theorists
might make the worst possible appointees, because they might only be
interested in pursuing their own ideological agenda and in increasing
their power through the expansion of judicial supremacy. Jeffersonian
departmentalism establishes three centers of power in the process of
constitutional interpretation, which reduces the comparative impor
tance of the Court in the resolution of great social questions. Even if
the political branches err and select nominees who seek to pursue
their own personal policy preferences, coordinate constitutional re
view limits the damage by providing for multiple avenues of resistance
and opposition. Political actors need not devote substantial resources
to Court appointments because they have other methods to achieve
their political goals. Of the two different theories of judicial review,
this one best fits the approaches that Yalof describes were pursued by
many Presidents. A theory of coordinate review means that Presi
dents can choose to use judicial selection for purposes other than pur
suing preferred ideological agendas because selections to the Court
are not so important that mistakes cannot be corrected.

64. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
SUPREME COURT (1999).

JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

65. This idea is similar to Neal Devins's point criticizing Sunstein's arguments for judi
cial minimalism as "0% principle 100% of the time." See Neal Devins, The Democracy
Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1992 n.84 (1999) (book review).
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Under a theory of judicial supremacy, however, the appointments
process assumes a more crucial role. Once the Court's interpretation
of the Constitution assumes finality and supremacy, controlling the
Court's direction becomes a valuable prize in the political struggle
over policy. With other methods for influencing constitutional law
precluded, changing the personnel on the Court becomes the only way
to win this contest. One then would expect either the President or the
Senate to seek to fill the Court with Justices who share their policy
preferences in an effort to lock in their policies well beyond the next
election. Political actors with these goals in mind ought to select
nominees with very different backgrounds from those of the depart
mentalist model. Rather than lawyers, the judicial supremacist might
seek out political leaders, constitutional theorists, and even philoso
phers, who not only agree with the ideological views of the President
or Senate, but also believe that the Court should retain the final say on
the interpretation of the Constitution. Because of the high stakes in
volved, Senators would pay little deference to the President's selec
tion, and one would expect voting in the Senate to follow party lines.
If the Court were to enjoy the power in the American political sys
tem called for by judicial supremacy, it would be surprising if the po
litical players did not seek to influence the judiciary to achieve their
goals. In this respect, the features of the appointments process shaped
by a context of judicial supremacy are similar to those predicted by
Peretti's arguments for a political Court. Neither Peretti nor the judi
cial supremacy approach, however, explains why recent Presidents
have nominated Justices such as Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, and why the Senate has swiftly and easily confirmed them. At
the time of their nomination, these last four appointments to the
Court did not fit the model of the politically astute leader or the broad
constitutional theorist, nor were they closely identified with any juris
prudential agenda. The recent record indicates that divided govern
ment can produce a surprising twist in the political model of the ap
pointments process.
When opposite political parties control the
Presidency and the Senate (or even when the President's party lacks a
filibuster-proof majority in the Senate), their efforts to pursue their
agendas through Court appointments may cancel each other out.
Ironically, this leads to the selection of the same class of nominees as
the departmentalist approach, which emphasizes lawyers over ideolo
gies.
CONCLUSION

These different approaches to judicial review bear different impli
cations for reform of the appointments process. After the Bork and
Thomas fights, numerous remedies have poured forth to fix the con
firmation mess. Some critics have proposed a more influential and
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permanent pre-nomination role for the Senate;66 some want more
questioning of nominees in open Senate hearings,67 while some want
less;68 some think that a nominee's qualifications are all that matter,69
while some believe that political views are just as important; some
think that nominees should announce criteria for confirmation in ad
vance;70 some would like to see less interest-group involvement;71 some
think a two-thirds requirement for confirmation would improve
things,72 while others have become enamored by the idea of judicial
term limits.73 Most of these reforms view the politicization of ap
pointments - whereby I mean the effort by the political branches to
achieve their policy goals by applying standard legislative and cam
paign techniques to nominees - as an enduring feature of the modern
process, whether one believes it is desirable or not. .
Yalof and Peretti seem to assume that the rise in the politicization
of the appointments process will be a permanent development as well.
For Yalof, Presidents face a trade-off between achieving their juris
prudential agenda and seeking a cooperative relationship with the
Senate. Presidents must decide whether risking a confrontation with
the Senate - by nominating an ideologically pure but politically con
troversial Justice - is worth the political capital that they may need
for other issues. For Peretti, Presidents and Senators must act in the
appointments arena to achieve their ideological goals, just as they
would with legislation. She views the politicization of judicial selec
tion not only as inevitable, but as a welcome event. The more honest
the political actors are in the appointments process, the more open the
debate over our politics will be, and the more democratically represen
tative our Justices will be. Further, Peretti would expect that the ap
pointments process ideally should yield politicians who are both inter
ested in acting in harmony with the political branches but also wish to
expand the political power of the Court.

66. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 4.
67. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate
Confirmation Hearings, 62 TuL. L. REV. 109 (1987).
68. See, e.g., Norman Vieira & Leonard E. Gross, The Appointments Clause: Judge
Bork and the Role of Ideology in Judicial Confirmations, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 311, 332-33
(1990); Paul A. Freund, Appointment ofJustices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1146, 1162-63 (1988).
69. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 4.
70. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and
Confirmation ofJustice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969, 992 (1992).
71. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Confirmation Process for Supreme Court Justices
in the Modern Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 580-86 (1988).
72 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Getting There: A BriefHistory ofthe Politics of Supreme
Court Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. l, 14-16 (1991).
73. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash, America's Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541 (1999)
(book review).
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Recent changes in the appointments process are no doubt a
reaction by the political system to the growth of the influence of the
Court in everyday life. As I have argued, this has resulted not just
from the extension of the Constitution to many areas of social life, but
also from the modem rise of judicial supremacy. If we are to engage
in a reform of the appointments process, with the object of removing
the excessively political techniques that Presidents, Senators, and
interest groups have brought to bear, we must change the importance
of the Supreme Court in American life. When the Court no longer
ultimately determines the great controversies of the day, the other
actors in the political system will not place so much importance on
controlling the selection of the Justices. Achieving this end can take
two possible paths: reversing the Court's modem extension of the
Constitution into any number of issues that strike at individuals'
moral, ethical, religious, or social beliefs; or reaffirming the notion of
coordinate constitutional review and rejecting the Court's efforts to
seize supremacy in interpreting the Constitution.
The first approach seems neither realistic nor desirable. At this
point, the Court is not going to engage in the wholesale surrender of
its Equal Protection, Due Process, or First Amendment jurisprudence.
Even if it were willing, the Court cannot resign from the job of
defending individual rights. Despite recent calls from both the right
and the left to do away with judicial review, it is a necessary function
of the federal courts to refuse to enforce laws that come into conflict
with the Constitution. Reversing judicial supremacy, however, seems
far more practical and worthwhile. Like fear, judicial supremacy
exists only if the other branches of government and the people believe
it to exist. No matter how strident the Court's claims to supremacy,
the political branches can reject the notion simply by continuing to
interpret the Constitution themselves, by enforcing their own
constitutional visions using their own powers, and by, at times,
ignoring the Court. For example, while Congress may respect Boerne
for the idea that the courts cannot be drafted into enforcing a different
interpretation of the Constitution, Congress should still use its plenary
powers to expand the protections for religious freedom. While Nixon
and Clinton did not present the best test cases, a future President
might challenge judicial supremacy by refusing to comply with judicial
discovery orders for privileged material.74
This second course of action for reforming the confirmation mess
is more appealing because much of it can be achieved by the unilateral
action of the political branches. By contrast, other efforts at reform
seem somewhat quixotic because the Court is not going to withdraw

74. This is what I believe Jefferson initially did in the Burr case, which led him and
Chief Justice Marshall to reach an accommodation between the branches over executive
privilege. See Yoo, supra note 38.
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from the race, privacy, criminal procedure, religion, or speech areas;
the Senate is not going to impose a two-thirds vote requirement for
confirmation; and we are not going to amend the Constitution to im
pose term limits on judges. Less sweeping procedural changes in the
appointments process will not make much difference unless we first
decide upon the normative goal that ought to guide the selection and
confirmation of Supreme Court Justices.
If the political actors wish to counter the Court's drive toward su
premacy, it can use the appointments process to begin a transition
back to a system of coordinate constitutional review. This approach
might bear many advantages over immediate efforts to deny the
binding effect of Supreme Court decisions, as the Court's function in
promoting the rule of law may have important benefits for political
stability. But the President and Senate can begin the transitional pe
riod by seeking nominees who deny the Court's own supremacy.
While the goal is to reduce value-voting among the Justices, nominat
ing individuals for their specific views on constitutional interpretiltion
may be necessary in order to reverse the recent trend. Further, ap
pointing Justices because of their views on constitutional and legal in
terpretation does not place nearly as much strain on our democratic
system as does the appointment of Justices for their views on policy.
Appointing lawyerly craftsmen to the Court might not be sufficient
to effect this transformation, as they would feel bound to respect
precedent, even that which expands the Court's power. Instead, po
litical actors with these goals in mind might seek, as ideal nominees,
lawyers or lower court judges who have worked in the executive or
congressional branches, especially in capacities where they worked on
constitutional issues. These lawyers are more likely to possess a de
veloped sensitivity to the constitutional prerogatives of the President
and Congress, and they are less likely to be wedded to the notion that
the Court must be supreme in the interpretation of the Constitution.
The political branches might seek academics and intellectuals, not
limited to just lawyers or law professors, who also doubt the Court's
role as final expositor of the Constitution and its role as arbiter of so
cial controversies. Regardless of the outcome of the next presidential
election, that is a litmus test upon which both the President and Senate
could agree.

